In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Scientia propter quid nobis—The Epistemic Independence of Metaphysics and Theology in the Quaestio de cognitione Dei attributed to Duns Scotus by Wouter GorisClaus A. AndersenGORIS, Wouter. Scientia propter quid nobis—The Epistemic Independence of Metaphysics and Theology in the Quaestio de cognitione Dei attributed to Duns Scotus. Münster: Aschendorff, 2022. viii + 296 pp. Paper, € 49.00The central claim of Wouter Goris's new book is that the (...) Quaestio de cognitione Dei traditionally (both in one late medieval manuscript and in some modern scholarship) attributed to John Duns Scotus not only is inauthentic but in fact represents an early reaction against Scotus's teaching on the scientific nature of metaphysics. The Quaestio in particular explores Scotus's distinction between a science "in itself" and one "for us" and, going beyond Scotus's own doctrine, shows how this distinction is applicable to metaphysics.The book is divided into three parts. Part 1 offers a critical edition of the Quaestio de cognitione Dei, which has hitherto been available in a plain transcription published by C. R. S. Harris in 1927. Harris's text was based on a single manuscript from the fifteenth century (Oxford, Merton College, Ms. 90); Goris bases his edition on a manuscript from the early fourteenth century (Assisi, Biblioteca Comunale, Ms. 172), one that does not attribute the text to Scotus. Goris highlights that the text has significant parallels in the prologue of John of Reading's Scriptum on the first book of the Sentences; there is presently not sufficient evidence for claiming that Reading is the author of the De cognitione Dei, but it does seem clear that either Reading or some other Franciscan friar relying on Reading's Scriptum authored the text between 1316 and 1325. The Quaestio itself consists of two articles. Two appendices to the edition document longer passages from Reading's Scriptum.Part 2 investigates the use of the distinction between a science in itself and one for us in Duns Scotus and some of the early Scotists. Scotus's doctrine developed over time. At Oxford Scotus taught that theology in se is about the divine essence in its particularity; theology for us is about the most perfect concept of God attainable for human beings by natural means, that is, the concept "infinite being." It falls to metaphysics to prove that there is such a kind of being. At Paris Scotus rather taught that both theology in se and theology for us are about the divine essence in its [End Page 549] particularity. The implication is that a strictly demonstrative science about God is possible for human beings in this present life, a knowledge of God that is completely independent of metaphysics. Goris argues that this shift in the view of theology explains the absence of Scotus's famous "twin doctrines" of the univocal concept of being and of being as the first adequate object of the intellect from his theological epistemology of the Parisian period. Not too surprisingly, in the wake of Scotus we find several authors grappling with the relationship between theology and metaphysics. The positions investigated by Goris vary considerably. Richard of Conington distinguishes between human metaphysical knowledge of being and God's own metaphysical knowledge of being; the latter represents a more perfect knowledge of both God himself and creatures as included under the concept of being. Francis of Marchia employs a distinction between a general metaphysics (about being as being) and a special metaphysics (about divine being), but on the level of science for us the special part of metaphysics is subordinated to the general one. Nicolas Bonetus, by contrast, advocates a sharp distinction between metaphysical knowledge of being and natural theology; he structures his metaphysics as a purely ontological discipline and treats natural theology as a separate science; Goris sees this reorganization as Bonetus's most decisive contribution to the history of metaphysics.Part 3 analyzes the fundamental doctrines defended in the Quaestio de cognitione Dei and compares them with those of Scotus and John of Reading. The first article of the Quaestio introduces two important distinctions, the first of which is between metaphysics in itself and metaphysics for us; these two... (shrink)

In Posterior Analytics 1.13, Aristotle introduced a distinction between two kinds of demonstrations: of the fact (quia), and of the reasoned fact (propter quid). Both demonstrations take a syllogistic form, in which the middle term links either two facts (in the case of quia demonstrations) or a proximate cause and a fact (in the case of propter quid demonstrations). While Aristotle stated that all the terms of one demonstration must be taken from within the same subject matter, he (...) admitted some exceptions in which the fact and the reasoned fact are instantiated by terms from different sciences, as when mathematics provides the reason and another science the empirical fact. This was the methodological foundation of the “mixed sciences”, a subject of varying interpretations in the thirteenth century. Roger Bacon (C. 1220–1292), adhering to Robert Grosseteste’s (C. 1168–1563) commentary on Posterior Analytics, presented a unique interpretation of this exception. He replaced propositional demonstrations with geometrical considerations and diagrams, thus producing geometrical arguments for theorems in natural philosophy. I focus on Bacon’s propter quid arguments, as applied in three case studies: (1) the heat caused by a body moving to its natural place; (2) the motion of the scale; (3) and the contraction of water. Based on an analysis of these demonstrations, I argue that Bacon’s interpretation of propter quid demonstration reflects his application of a scientific methodology that imbues geometrical objects with causal power over material bodies. (shrink)

Die metaphysische Spekulation über die Natur der Ideen gilt als eines der wichtigsten philosophischen Themen bis weit ins 20. Jahrhundert hinein. Im Nachdenken über die Ideen hat die Metaphysik versucht, die unveränderlichen Prinzipien zu entdecken, die die Wirklichkeit ordnen und ihren intelligiblen Charakter erklären und begründen. Die Frage nach den Ideen liegt somit an der Basis des metaphysischen Denkens überhaupt, das nach der klassischen Bestimmung des Aristoteles als Wissenschaft von den Prinzipien und Ursachen des Seienden als solchen verstanden werden kann.

Research suggests that the explicit reasoning we offer to ourselves and to others is often rationalization, that we act instead on instincts, inclinations, stereotypes, emotions, neurobiology, habits, reactions, evolutionary pressures, unexamined principles, or justifications other than the ones we think we’re acting on, then we tell a post hoc story to justify our actions. I consider two benefits of rationalization, once we realize that rationalization is sincere. It allows us to work out, under practical pressure of rational consistency, which are (...) good reasons to act on. Rationalization also prompts us to establish meaningful patterns out of merely permissible options. (shrink)

This paper enquires into the possibility of establishing a causal link between social performance (SP) and financial performance (FP) in corporate social responsibility (CSR). It shows that this endeavour is limited by several biasing factors (such as time horizons, sample choices and the tools chosen to measure SP and FP) and faces the logical fallacy post hoc ergo propter hoc (after this, therefore because of this), which indicates that a sequence of events does not necessarily establish a causal link. (...) The paper contributes to the methodological literature in CSR currently focused on empirical tests aiming to discern the linkages between SP and FP, both by emphasising the interest in interpreting and justifying SP and by suggesting a redirection of empirical efforts towards the understanding of entrepreneurial preference for a specific type of SP. (shrink)

El objetivo de este pequeño trabajo es ayudar a comprender la necesidad de la composición real en el ser participado. Lo hacemos sirviéndonos de una parte de la magnífica obra del p. Fabro, La noción metafísica de participación. En la primera parte de nuestro trabajo nos serviremos de algunos de los textos de Santo Tomás que reportaba el p. Fabro, los que más nos ayuden a comprender la demostración. En la segunda, y al mismo efecto, estudiaremos el silogismo del p. (...) Fabro, con el cual dicho autor trataba de condensar la demostración de la composición real en todo ser participado. (shrink)

O presente artigo intenta perquirir o pensamento do abade e místico medieval Joaquim de Fiore (1132-1202), no que tange a concepção escatológica. O abade cisterciense e filósofo místico, defensor do milenarismo e do advento da idade do Espírito Santo deu origem a diversos movimentos filosóficos, com destaque para os joaquimitas. Seu pensamento foi combatido por Tomás de Aquino e condenado pelo Concílio de Laterão de 1215. Partindo de uma releitura dos escritos de Joaquim de Fiore (Liber Concordiae Novi ac Veteris (...) Testamenti, Expositio in Apocalipsim e Psalterium Decem Chordarum) buscar-se-á ponderar o contributo de seu pensamento, a teologia como história trinitário-escatológica. O abade calabrês sente-se autorizado a superar o absolutismo crístico, favorecendo uma concepção mais trinitária da história com acentos escatológicos e apocalípticos. Por fim, o artigo busca contribuir positivamente no retorno aos escritos joaquinistas que muito podem contribuir para a teologia como história humano-Trintária. (shrink)

IT is strange that the informal fallacies should strike us as such obvious breaches of thinking and advocacy, yet should have met with such little success in finding a respectable home within mature logical theory. It might seem that respectable and mature logical theory is most mature and most respectable in the theory of propositions, and that its maturity and respectability in the other logical domains rapidly diminish in inverse proportion to the susceptibility of those domains to be reduced to (...) the logic of propositions. But we are not anxious to promote so severe a view of theoretical accomplishment, and we shall suppose that, at the very least, the informal fallacies have a degree of systematicity that will at once advance our understanding of them nicely beyond the level of intuitive impressions, and also place into retirement the hopelessly inadequate accounts that litter too many otherwise admirable textbooks. (shrink)

This short essay will attempt to show that although Karl Rahner would be in basic agreement with the concern of “Dominus Iesus” about “religious relativism” and in basic agreement with the claims of the Catholic Church (as expressed in Vatican II) about the role of Jesus as universal savior and about the unique role of the Roman Catholic church in God’s salvific plan for the world, he would not agree with the spirit or tone of this declaration from a (...) Vatican Congregation. Rahner’s writings set a more positive tone framed by his classic retrieval of the concept of mystery in Roman Catholic theology that invites dialog with people of other religious traditions. Three characteristics of that invitational spirit of Rahner are highlighted in this essay: (1) the life-long process of becoming Christian; (2) the inadequacy of all human expressions in the face of mystery; (3) the need to be non-competitive in any ecumenical or inter-religious dialog. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine Scotus’s claim that the categories are the subject of a propter quid science. In order to see the significance of this claim, I first trace the development of the idea that the categories are the subject of a science from Martin of Denmark, Peter of Auvergne, and Simon of Faversham. I then turn toDuns Scotus’s account of the categories as the subject of a propter quid science. Throughout the discussion, I concentrate on the (...) fundamental problems confronting anyone who claims that there is a science of the categories: namely, how they, being ten, can have an appropriate unity. Scotus, as we will see, will answer this problem by claiming that the intellect causes a greater unity in second intentions than the corresponding unity that exists in the world. As a consequence, Scotus contends that the categories are the subject of a propter quid science, one that is radically different from the science of metaphysics. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine Scotus’s claim that the categories are the subject of a propter quid science. In order to see the significance of this claim, I first trace the development of the idea that the categories are the subject of a science from Martin of Denmark, Peter of Auvergne, and Simon of Faversham. I then turn toDuns Scotus’s account of the categories as the subject of a propter quid science. Throughout the discussion, I concentrate on the (...) fundamental problems confronting anyone who claims that there is a science of the categories: namely, how they, being ten, can have an appropriate unity. Scotus, as we will see, will answer this problem by claiming that the intellect causes a greater unity in second intentions than the corresponding unity that exists in the world. As a consequence, Scotus contends that the categories are the subject of a propter quid science, one that is radically different from the science of metaphysics. (shrink)

In general, the false cause fallacy occurs when the “link between premises and conclusion depends on some imagined causal connection that probably does not exist”. There are three different ways an argument can commit the false cause fallacy: post hoc ergo propter hoc; cum hoc ergo propter hoc; and ignoring common cause. This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy, 'ignoring common cause'. The commercial exploited the false cause fallacy to get consumers to buy (...) its product. This fallacy is also present in many of the arguments concerning the alleged connection between vaccines and autism despite the plethora of evidence otherwise. The chapter consists of various examples showcasing the fallacy of ignoring common cause. It also compares the examples, showing that slight changes can lead the other types of false cause fallacies to occur. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called the false cause fallacy. This fallacy occurs when the “link between premises and conclusion depends on some imagined causal connection that probably does not exist”. There are three different ways an argument can commit the false cause fallacy: post hoc ergo propter hoc; cum hoc ergo propter hoc; and ignoring common cause. The chapter deals with post hoc ergo propter hoc. One example of the (...) post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy that has had a great impact on public health has been the recent fear of childhood vaccines, particularly the measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) vaccine and the concern it can cause autism. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy: 'false cause'. In general, the false cause fallacy occurs when the “link between premises and conclusion depends on some imagined causal connection that probably does not exist”. There are three different ways an argument can commit the false cause fallacy: post hoc ergo propter hoc; cum hoc ergo propter hoc; and ignoring common cause. Like the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy, this fallacy is guilty (...) of trying to establish a causal connection between two events on dubious grounds. The way to avoid committing the cum hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy is to study correlative relationships more carefully in order to decipher if an actual causal relationship exists rather than assuming the latter follows from the former. (shrink)

: We question the claim, common since Duhem, that sixteenth century astronomy, and especially the Wittenberg interpretation of Copernicus, was instrumentalistic rather than realistic. We identify a previously unrecognized Wittenberg astronomer, Edo Hildericus (Hilderich von Varel), who presents a detailed exposition of Copernicus's cosmology that is incompatible with instrumentalism. Quotations from other sixteenth century astronomers show that knowledge of the real configuration of the heavens was unattainable practically, rather than in principle. Astronomy was limited to quia demonstrations, although demonstration (...) class='Hi'>propter quid remained the ideal. We suggest that Osiander's notorious preface to Copernicus expresses these sixteenth century commonplaces rather than twentieth century instrumentalism, and that neither `realism', nor `instrumentalism', in their modern meanings, apply to sixteenth century astronomy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.1 (2001) 49-75 [Access article in PDF] Sensible Ends:Latent Teleology in Descartes' Account of Sensation Alison Simmons One of Descartes' hallmark contributions to natural philosophy is his denunciation of teleology. It is puzzling, then, to find him arguing in Meditation VI that human beings have sensations in order to preserve the union of mind and body (AT VII 83). 1 This appears to (...) be just the sort of teleological explanation that he proscribes. Descartes' Anglo-American commentators have had little to say about the teleological overtones of his claims about sensation. His French commentators acknowledge these overtones, but seem largely untroubled by them. 2 It is worth pausing to be troubled, for a closer analysis reveals that Descartes' famous proscription against teleology is not as simple as it is generally thought to be. In the first half of this essay, I argue that Descartes advocates a genuinely teleological conception of the senses. My aim is not to charge Descartes with employing illicit teleology, but to argue that there is a place for teleology even in his revisionist natural philosophy. Accordingly, in the second half of this essay, I argue that Descartes' assault on teleological explanation is [End Page 49] not a sweeping assault on finality, but a more directed attack on particular uses of ends in natural philosophy. Descartes' assault leaves standing a form of teleological explanation that proves crucial to his own treatment of sensation. 1. Descartes' Rejection of Teleological Explanation at a Glance A teleological explanation is one that purports to account for something in terms of its ends or its function relative to the ends of the system of which it is a part. Aristotle's physics provides many classic examples: plants produce leaves for the protection of their fruit; spiders spin webs in order to catch food; animals grow sharp front teeth and dull back teeth in order to facilitate biting and chewing respectively; eyes are for seeing. According to Aristotle, all natural phenomena are directed toward ends and no explanation is complete without a teleological component that specifies the end for the sake of which the phenomenon occurs. Indeed ends take explanatory priorityover other causes: "Both causes [the end and the matter] must be stated by the student of nature, but especially the end; for that is the cause of the matter, not vice versa." 3 And: [T]he causes concerned in natural generation are, as we see, more than one. There is the cause for the sake of which [the end], and the cause whence the beginning of motion comes [the efficient cause]. Now we must decide which of these two causes comes first, which second. Plainly, however, that cause is the first which we call that for the sake of which. For this is the account of the thing, and the account forms the starting-point.4In other words, Aristotle argues that natural substances have the matter they do, have the parts or organs they do, are organized as they are and act as they do for the sake of their ends. To explain why things are as they are, the natural philosopher must therefore explain the ways in which they contribute to ends.Among the late scholastic Aristotelians familiar to Descartes there is considerable debate concerning the causal efficacy of ends. Genuine final causation, in which something is said to be acted on by an end, is limited to the intentional behavior of rational agents who consciously recognize their ends: only something that recognizes an end can be "moved" by one. Even here the sort of causation involved is peculiar: a rational agent is "moved" by an end insofar as the end induces a "metaphorical motion" toward (or desire for) the end in the agent's will. 5 While these scholastic Aristotelians resist attributing final causation [End Page 50] to non-rational creatures, they nevertheless persist in attributing ends to them. When Toletus, Rubio, the Coimbrans and Suarez take up the question whether nature acts propter finem, each answers it affirmatively: natural... (shrink)

Excerpt from Poetarum Philosophorum Fragmenta Plagulis correctis indicibusque non sine taedio confectis dum respiro et laetiore animo quid praefandum sit meditor, ecce nuntius longe tris tissimus afi'ertur, georgium kaibelium nobis litterisque acerba morte ereptum esse, qui non solum studiorum societate inde a beatissimo oon tu'oernio - Bonnensi mihi erat coniunctissimus, sed in hoc quoque communi amicorum opere velut auspex et signifer, cuius auctoritatem me aequi et decebat et iuvabat. Nam singularis graecae artis cognitio, quae in illo fuit, in nullo genere (...) litterarum magis enituit quam in Comicis, unde splendidum ante biennium factum est huius Corporis initium. Iam adu lescentem prima tirocinia in Aristophane ponere memini eundemque audio supremam fuisse moribundi curam ac querelem. Inter bos vitae laboriosae et fructuosae terminos omnem graecitatem peragravit et undique messem uberrimam rettulit; at nusquam libentius et intentius versabatur quam in atticae comoediae reliquiis. Dorienses enim, quos edidit, propter illos cpinor tetigerat.' quodsi verum est cum primi illins voluminis perfectione vix unam alteramve aequalium editionem recte posse eom parari, quid prasstaturum eum fuisse credimus, si fatum concessisset, ut ipsam 'atticam comoediam nobis ex fragmentis instauraret, in qua totus habitabat et spirabat! Aut nemo mortalium aut, si quisquam, ille et natus erat et paratus ad Menandri et aequalium umbras ex inferis citandas et in vitae lucem revocandas. Adeo in intimam eorum consuetudinem inde fesso labore atque fortasse magis etiam sensus quadam cognatione se insinuaverat. Nam tota eius indoles ad atticum istum saporem facta erat. Ut scripture eius elegantia apicum prae ceteris nitebat, ut suavissima sermocinatio mirum quantum amicos tenebat, priusquam morbi ingra veseentie tormentis animi serenitas obscurari coepta est, ita tota eius ars versus graecos et exblicandi et pangendi Praxiteleo quodam perfusa erat nitore. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

The name Iphianassa occurs only once in Latin literature—in the proem to De Rerum Natura. Here Lucretius illustrates the evils of religion with a description of Iphianassa's sacrifice at Aulis :illud in his rebus uereor, ne forte rearisimpia te rationis inire elementa uiamqueindugredi sceleris. quod contra saepius illareligio peperit scelerosa atque impia facta.Aulide quo pacto Triuiai uirginis aramIphianassai turparunt sanguine foedeductores Danaum delecti, prima uirorum.cui simul infula uirgineos circumdata comptusex utraque pari malarum parte profusast,et maestum simul ante aras adstare parentemsensit (...) et hunc propter ferrum celare ministrosaspectuque suo lacrimas effundere ciuis,muta metu terram genibus summissa petebat.nec miserae prodesse in tali tempore quibatquod patrio princeps donarat nomine regem.nam sublata uirum manibus tremibundaque ad arasdeductast, non ut sollemni more sacrorumperfecto posset claro comitari Hymenaeo,sed casta inceste nubendi tempore in ipsohostia concideret mactatu maesta parentis,exitus ut classi felix faustusque daretur.tantum religio potuit suadere malorum.It is clear that Lucretius treats the name Iphianassa as a synonym for Iphigenia. Homer and Sophocles mention a daughter of Agamemnon called Iphianassa, but in neither author is she the daughter who was sacrificed at Aulis. The first known mention of this myth was in the Cypria, where, according to the summary of Proclus, the daughter was called Iphigenia. Hesiod refers to it in the Catalogue of Women, where he calls the daughter Iphimede. From the fifth century b.c.e., the extant sources, beginning with Pindar and Aeschylus, call her Iphigenia. Why did Lucretius choose Iphianassa? (shrink)

Het zal geen van de aanwezigen verbazen dat we het volgende allemaal tegenkomen in empirisch onderzoek: verborgen aannames, ongegronde conclusies, vreemde analyse-eenheden, een ontbrekende uitsplitsing van gegevens, een ‘post hoc ergo propter hoc’-redenering (een simpele correlatie die leidt tot ongerechtvaardigde gevolgtrekkingen over oorzaak en gevolg), ontbrekende contextuele verklaringen, onjuiste en misleidende vergelijkingen, onthutsend onbetrouwbare steekproeven die leiden tot uiterst dubieuze extrapolaties, en hypotheses die voorspellen of proberen te achterhalen en bevestigen wat de gemiddelde persoon al weet. We beschikken natuurlijk (...) over een overvloed aan gegevens uit pedagogisch en onderwijskundig onderzoek en een haast onbegrensde hoeveelheid grafieken en tabellen met cijfers die pretenderen iets te meten. Deze gegevens komen echter maar al te vaak tot stand op basis van concepten van twijfelachtige waarde. Er ontbreekt vaak een ondersteunend theoretisch kader waarmee bevindingen kunnen worden geïnterpreteerd, verklaard of vertaald naar andere contexten, en waarmee bovendien de betekenis van de resultaten aan niet-specialisten kan worden duidelijk gemaakt. (shrink)

W. Goris, Scientia propter quid nobis. The Epistemic Independence of Metaphysics and Theology in the Quaestio de cognitione Dei attributed to Duns Scotus, Aschendorff, Munster 2022 (Archa Verbi. Su...

The problem of method, which became one of the most oft-examined themes in Renaissance philosophy, is likewise the subject of Jan Jessenius' Et Philosophiae et Medicinae Solidae Studiosis. In the context of contemporary discussions which ended up distinguishing between methods of cognition and methods of presentation, it is shown that Jessenius does not avail himself of this distinction - despite the fact that he is considered a student of the Paduan school. On one hand, Jessenius does distance himself from a (...) rhetoricised form of logic which blurred the difference between method and the order of knowledge; on the other, he presents the method of attaining knowledge as a component part of the method of education. He understands logic, referring to Aristotle, mainly as an analytic art - not as dialectics. Analytics begin with induction, continues through the probabilistic syllogism, and is followed by a demonstration of the causes of things, thus drawing in essence from the progression of the demonstratio quia to the demonstratio propter quid, which the Paduan Aristotelians referred to as a regressus. According to Jessenius, however, the last phase of the whole process is definition, though its meaning is never precisely delimited. It appears that, rather than Paduan methodology, Jessenius took up the Aristotelian tradition which distinguishes four questions and associates different faculties of the human soul to each. He leaves aside the problems which were connected with the interpretation of Aristotle's texts during the Renaissance. In Jessenius' address, the question regarding whether scientific cognition is derived from first principles or first concepts remains unresolved. Johannes Jessenius thus appropriated the ideas of his Paduan teachers in a rather inconsistent manner and passed them on to his students in the same spirit, which bears witness to the level at which the methodology of science had been developed outside of its great centres at the turn of the 17th century. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Anonymus Defensorium Ockham Ms. Romae, bibl. Angelica 1017 ff. 21r-36r Conspectus siglorum: = addendum censeo [....] = delendum censeo«..» = litterae illegibiles factae sive propter codicis corruptionem deperditae [[..]] = scriptor delevit Y.../ = in margine sive supra lineam inserta (?) = lectio incerta t...-t = corrupta esse videntur I22rl = incipit pagina 22 recto codicis«cCapitulum 15. De novem praedicamentis denominativis> Praedicamenta (adn. in mg.: Capitulo 15) alia (...) a substantia sunt quaedam denominationes substantiae. Denominatur enim substantia a qualitate 'qualis', a quantitate 'quanta', a relatione 'relata', \ab/ actione 'agens', et sic de singulis. Unde sicut conceptus ordinati in praedicamento substantiae sunt univoci, habentes univocam praedicationem de substantia prima, ita conceptus ordinati in praedicamentis accidentalibus sunt conceptus denominativi respectu substantiae, habentes praedicationem denominativam de ipsa—licet possunt esse univoci in suo ordine, et de suis inferioribus univoce praedicari. Est autem (adn. in mg.: Quaestio bona quarta) hic investigandum, utrum secundum multitudinem denominationum de substantia sit multitudo realitatum; ut, sicut sunt denominationes secundum novem genera distinctae, ita res et realitates novem generum distinctae. Quae est utrum novem denominantia substantiam sint dispositiones distinctae realiter a substantia, aut sint 111 Franciscan Studies (54) 1994-1997 112ANONYMUS dispositiones distinctae tantum ratione, sicut Commentator1 innuit. (adn. in ima pag.: Utrum secundum multitudinem denominationum de substantia sit multitudo realitatum, id est utrum novem praedicamenta distinctas habent realitates.) Et ista dubitatio de praedicamentis denominativis consimilis est dubitationi superius2 factae de praedicatis univocis et de correspondentia praedicamentorum et realitatum. Et videtur hie conformiter dicendum sicut de praedictis, scilicet quod multitudo rerum non est secundum multitudinem coneeptuum quiditativorum. Et hoc manifestum est, sumentibus nobis suppositiones has: Primo (adn. in mg.: Prima suppositio) quod substantia habet entitatem propriam. Ex illo sequitur evidenter intentum, nam si praedicamenta denominantia substantiam distinguerentur ab ea realiter, circumscriptis illis realitatibus, nulla remaneret realitas substantiae propria. Si enim substantia materialis haberet [[aliunde figuram puta a qualitate]] aliunde extensionem, puta a quantitate, aliunde figuram, puta a qualitate, aliunde positionem, et ita de alus, istis circumscriptis, quaero quid remaneret pro entitate substantiae? Non apparet quod aliquid, nisi fingas totam realitatem substantiae materialis posse habere esse punctuale et in puncto salvari, quod non capit imaginario. Quia de ratione substantiae materialis et corporeae, quae distinguitur contra immaterialem et incorpoream, est quod habeat partem extra partem.3 Et ita videtur quod substantia materialis erit seipsa quanta, et seipsa terminata, et per consequens seipsa figurata. Seipsa, inquam, et per se, perseitate excludente rem aliam. Secunda suppositio (adn. in mg.: Secunda suppositio) est quod non est contradictio realitatem unam esse, realitate ab ea distincta non existente. Patet, quia non est contradictio nisi affirmetur et negetur idem de eodem,4 implicite vel explicite. Et ista suppositio 1Cf. Averroës In Metaph. V com. 14 (1562) 148EF. 2Cf. supra cap. 11 'De univocis'; cf. cap. 12 (f. 24v): Et manifestum est, quoniam non oportet multitudinem esse in conceptibus, sicut nec multitudo in conceptibus sequitur multitudinem eorum quae sunt in vocibus, necessario sumentibus nobis suppositiones has. 3Cf. Guillelmus de Ockham Summa logicae I c. 44 (OPh I 137): quantitas continua permanens nihil aliud est nisi res una habens partem situaliter distantem a parte. 4Cf. Aristot, De interp. 9, 18a29-30: In his ergo quae sunt et facta sunt necesse est affirmationem vel negationem veram vel falsam esse; Anal. post. 1,11 77a30; Tópica VI,6 143bl6: Nam de omni vel affirmatio vel negatio vera est; Metaph. IV,9 1005bl9- THE DEFENSORIUM OCKHAM1 1 3 concludit similiter intentum. Nam quia contradictio est corpus de genere substantiae (id est substantiam materialem) esse, et non esse quantum (id est non habere partem extra partem); ideo quantitas non est alia res a corpore. Item quia contradictio est magnitudinem esse, et ipsam non esse terminatam et figuratam; ideo figura non est alia res a corpore sive magnitudine. Item quia contradictio est totum esse, et non esse maius parvus distinguerentur specie cum sint plures partes materiae in magno quam in parvo. Solet etiam dici quod magnum et parvum non variant speciem. Istae viae (adn. in mg.: Quod quantitas continua non sit res distincta) non concludunt de quantitate continua, quia non repugnaret sibi unitas; nec ex parte sui, quin scilicet possit habere unitatem formae accidentalis convenientem, nec ex parte subiecti, quin scilicet posset habere subiectum unum. Sed sufficienter videtur convinci quod... (shrink)

The verse hinc subitae mortes atque intestata senectus has long fuelled considerable debate and discussion among classical scholars. This hexameter occurs in the passage of the first satire that describes the aspect of the patron-client relationship where the rich patron, ignoring the plight of his poor and hungry clients, enjoys a sumptuous but deadly feast. After dining on delicacies such as boar and peacock, he bathes on a bloated stomach, causing him to die suddenly and apparently intestate, and causing those (...) angry at being deprived of their legacy to cheer at his funeral :quanta est gula quae sibi totosponit apros, animal propter conuiuia natum!poena tamen praesens, cum tu deponis amictusturgidus et crudum pauonem in balnea portas.hinc subitae mortes atque intestata senectus.it noua nec tristis per cunctas fabula cenas;ducitur iratis plaudendum funus amicis. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Separating the Human from the Divine Cesáreo Bandera University ofNorth Carolina at Chapel Hill Myths are hard to die. One such myth concerns what happened with poetry in general, that is to say, imaginative literature or literary fiction, in the transition from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance and beyond. Its basic outline was developed during the nineteenth century. J. E. Spingarn, for example, echoes such a myth in (...) his History of Literary Criticism in the Renaissance, first published in 1899, which has gone through many editions and reprintings since then. In it we read the following: The first problem of Renaissance criticism was the justification of imaginative literature. The existence and continuity of the aesthetic consciousness, and perhaps, in a less degree, of the critical faculty, throughout the Middle Ages, can hardly be denied; yet distrust of literature was keenest among the very class of men in whom the critical faculty might be presupposed, and it was as the handmaid of philosophy, and most of all as the vassal of theology, that poetry was chiefly valued.... The Renaissance was thus confronted with the necessity ofjustifying its appreciation of the vast body of literature which the Revival of Learning had recovered for the modern world. (3) Speaking of Savonarola's De Divisione ac Utilititate Omnium Scientiarum, written about 1492, he concludes as follows: In fine, as a reformer, he represents for us the religious reaction against the paganization of culture by the humanists. But the forces against him were too strong. Even the Christianization of culture effected during the next century by the Council of Trent was hardly more than temporary. Humanism, which represents 74Cesáreo Bandera the revival of ancient pagan culture, and rationalism, which represents the growth of the modem spirit in science and art, were currents too powerful to be impeded by any reformer, however great. (14) This general picture of the historical standing and the fate of literary fiction as we move from the Middle Ages into the modern era, is still very much with us, even though it is ill at ease with, or flatly contradicted by, undeniable historical facts. For example, the incredible notion of a "paganization of culture by the humanists" would have horrified somebody as profoundly Christian as Petrarch and, later on, Erasmus, who criticized the scholastics "in the name of a purer and simpler mode of piety and religious devotion" (Mazzeo 17). Or the mistaken idea that modern rationalism was much more hospitable to poetry than the old scholastic one. For from the seventeenth century on, as J. F. West has pointed out, the whole tide of [scientific] opinion was running strongly against poetry, metaphor, and poetic prose. The philosophers generally saw them as an obstacle to truth. Hobbes regarded metaphor as one of the hindrances to straight thinking. Rousseau thought that the philosophy of Descartes had 'cut the throat of poetry'; and John Locke, late in the century, openly regarded poetry as made up of 'pleasant pictures and agreeable visions in the fancy,' but basically misleading. (114) It is indeed true that in medieval scholasticism poetry occupies the lowest rank in the hierarchical structure of the arts and sciences. But it does have a place there. It would have never occurred to Thomas Aquinas, for example, to expel it from that position as something dangerous, something to be avoided. In fact, as he tells us at the beginning of the Summa Theologica, theology itself, the highest of the sciences, does not consider it below its dignity to make use of metaphor and other poetic devices propter utilitatem ac necessitatem. And yet it is precisely that kind of violent expulsion ofpoetic fiction that will be attempted during the Renaissance. In the words of Russell Fraser, "it is in the Renaissance, and not the Middle Ages that the artist is driven from the commonwealth" (39). It was then that the "war against poetry" intensified to fever pitch. It is, therefore, an error to imagine that those in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries who bitterly attacked poetic fiction in general and the theater in particular as a very dangerous threat to religion and morality, were fanatic hold-overs from a medieval past... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Christianity and the Religions: From Confrontation to DialogueJohn BorelliChristianity and the Religions: From Confrontation to Dialogue. By Jacques Dupuis, SJ. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2001. 276 pp.Why read Jacques Dupuis's Christianity and the Religions (2001) when his more comprehensive, ground-breaking Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism (Orbis, 1997) is still available? Father Dupuis reminds us in the introduction to Christianity that he has actually written three books (...) on the same subject—Jesus Christ at the Encounter of World Religions (Orbis, 1991) being the first—but he reaffirms the central importance of Religious Pluralism. After publication of this second work, his editors wanted another volume on the same topic, "less ponderous, more accessible, and aimed at an audience broader than the circle of specialists and the academy." That was the origin of Christianity and the Religions, a story Fr. Dupuis related to me when I visited him at Gregorian University in early February 2001. It was meant to be an easier-to-read version of Religious Pluralism, something for students who do not need abundant references to authors and historical developments. Circumstances, however, added another dimension to the need for yet another volume. [End Page 182]Christianity and the Religions was ready for publication in early 2001, but Fr. Dupuis was waiting for "official notification" from the Holy See's Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith regarding its charges that Religious Pluralism contained "serious doctrinal error." By then, the case was in its thirty-second and final month, for later in February 2001 he received word from Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, prefect of the Congregation, that the charge had been reduced to "ambiguities and difficulties on important points which could lead a reader to erroneous or harmful opinions." Dupuis last appeared before Cardinal Ratzinger and the Congregation's advisers on the day before Dominus Iesus was released in September 2000, accompanied by Fr. Peter-Hans Kolvenbach, superior general of the Jesuits, and Dupuis's advocate and colleague at the Gregorian University, Fr. Gerald O'Collins. Dupuis used the opportunity of a more accessible version of the book in question to address squarely the charges raised against him. He writes in the introduction to Christianity and the Religions: "Suffice it to say that in this new book I have scrupulously avoided all expressions that could raise any misunderstanding or create ambiguity over either the content of the faith or my thought." Dupuis dedicated the book to retired Cardinal Franz Kōnig. He chose to quote an earlier (1963) text by Cardinal Ratzinger on the page following the dedication: "What the Church needs today, as always, are not adulators to extol the status quo, but men whose humility and obedience are no less than their passion for truth: men who brave every misunderstanding and attack as they bear witness; men who in a word, love the Church more than ease and the unruffled course of their personal destiny." In 1999, Ratzinger and Kōnig had exchanged views, point and counterpoint, in the British Catholic weekly, The Tablet, over Dupuis's earlier Religious Pluralism.Fr. Jacques Dupuis died of an apparent stroke on 28 December 2004 at age 81. Although the investigation had brought him increased attention and invitations to speak, he was in Rome, his home since 1984, at the time of his death. When I visited him in 2001 and again heard him speak at the Catholic University of America just twenty-four days before his death, it was clear how much the case and accompanying suspicion had hurt him. Dupuis was principally a theologian who had considered it his good fortune to have lived and taught in India for thirty-six years. He also had taught theology for nearly fifteen years at Gregorian University, the premier university of his religious order. Many viewed the outcome of the investigation as a vindication of his work because he did not have to change a single sentence in Religious Pluralism for it to remain in publication, but the success of his defense came at a great price. The shadow of suspicion never left him. He had adopted a style of stopping, often amidst reflections on religious... (shrink)

cum prorepserunt primis animalia terris, mutum et turpe pecus, glandem atque cubilia propter unguibus et pugnis, dein fustibus, atque ita porro pugnabant armis, quae post fabricauerat usus, donec uerba, quibus uoces sensusque notarent, nominaque inuenere; dehinc absistere bello, oppida coeperunt munire et ponere leges, ne quis … uoces and sensus are not in pari materia; indeed, uoces notare is nonsense, as Gow says. The defect was first pointed out by Housman, J. Phil. xviii, pp. 5–8; his remedy was to (...) transpose one word and read donec uerba, quibus sensus, uocesque, notarent, nominaque inuenere. I doubt if any scholar not already familiar with Housman's note could understand his Latin here without considerable analytical effort; and I cannot but think that Housman was for once demanding from a pair of commas a cabalistic virtue hardly resident in the seal of Solomon. Admittedly he supplies a long list — one page and a half—of illustrative dislocations; but in my opinion two objections remain. In the first place, ‘interlacing’ of the clauses A B in the form A B A B is quite frequent in Latin verse; but A B A B A is rare in the extreme, not to be found in Horace, not perhaps in any Latin author except Lucretius. Secondly, the insertion of uoces, ‘expressions’ generally , in such a way as to disrupt the pair uerba nominaque ‘verbs and nouns’ would be awkward, and for Horace anomalous, in the most lucid of contexts; here it makes confusion worse confounded. (shrink)

cum prorepserunt primis animalia terris, mutum et turpe pecus, glandem atque cubilia propter unguibus et pugnis, dein fustibus, atque ita porro pugnabant armis, quae post fabricauerat usus, donec uerba, quibus uoces sensusque notarent, nominaque inuenere; dehinc absistere bello, oppida coeperunt munire et ponere leges, ne quis … uoces and sensus are not in pari materia; indeed, uoces notare is nonsense, as Gow says. The defect was first pointed out by Housman, J. Phil. xviii, pp. 5–8; his remedy was to (...) transpose one word and read donec uerba, quibus sensus, uocesque, notarent, nominaque inuenere. I doubt if any scholar not already familiar with Housman's note could understand his Latin here without considerable analytical effort; and I cannot but think that Housman was for once demanding from a pair of commas a cabalistic virtue hardly resident in the seal of Solomon. Admittedly he supplies a long list — one page and a half—of illustrative dislocations; but in my opinion two objections remain. In the first place, ‘interlacing’ of the clauses A B in the form A B A B is quite frequent in Latin verse; but A B A B A is rare in the extreme, not to be found in Horace, not perhaps in any Latin author except Lucretius. Secondly, the insertion of uoces, ‘expressions’ generally, in such a way as to disrupt the pair uerba nominaque ‘verbs and nouns’ would be awkward, and for Horace anomalous, in the most lucid of contexts; here it makes confusion worse confounded. (shrink)

This article pursues Rahner’s idea that the Holy Spirit has the role of “Spirit of Christ” even before the Incarnation, namely as “entelechy” directed to the Christ event. In the article, particular use is made of a biblical text hitherto not invoked in this connection, namely 1 Peter 1:11, from which a biblical base for this theology is developed. The article also investigates Teilhard de Chardin’s theory of evolution encompassing the world religions and Christianity, the absolute religion. The idea of (...) the Spirit of Christ as entelechy is clarified and refined by application of the author’s construct of the “return” model of the Trinity, in which the Son does not just come forth from the Father, but returns to him in the power of the Spirit (see his newly published book, Deus Trinitas). Before, and in reparation for, the Son’s historical return to the Father, in Christ, the Spirit, precisely as entelechy, has to seek him in history, that is, through the creation and evolution of the cosmos, the arrival of humans, the consequent and new operation of the Spirit as grace, and the history of Israel culminating in the lives of Mary and, finally, Jesus, in whom this operation finds its final goal. Moreover, the role of the Spirit as entelechy complements and forms a unity with that of the same Spirit (again “Spirit of Christ”) as sent historically by the glorified Christ upon the Church, and continues even after the Incarnation, in leading to Christ (as “anonymous Christians”) men and women of goodwill, including those belonging to the world religions who have not yet had the gospel effectively preached to them. Finally, the paper notes that it covers some of the same ground as the Vatican Declaration Dominus Iesus, but in a different way, namely as instructed by the work of Teilhard and Rahner. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 23 (2003) 165-167 [Access article in PDF] Christianity in the Crucible of East-West Dialogue: A Critical Lookat Catholic Participation; And God, Zen, and the Intuition Of Being. By James Arraj. Chiloquin, Ore: Inner Growth Books, 2001. 335 pp. This book combines an original book-length essay, Critical Look at the Catholic Participation in the East-West Dialogue, and a new edition of the 1988 work God, Zen, and the (...) Intuition of Being. In the first part of the volume, Arraj discusses the approaches of a large variety of individuals and institutions who have been involved in the Christian dialogue with Buddhism (Habito, Enomiya-Lasalle, Jaeger, MacInnes, Hawk, Kennedy, Corless, etc.) and in the dialogue with Hinduism (Abhishiktananda, Grant, de Mello, Griffiths, Teasdale, etc.). The main perspective from which he discusses each of these authors is that of their conception of the relationship between Christian contemplation and enlightenment or realization. Arraj finds most of the existing approaches to the East-West dialogue wanting insofar as they all consider the Christian experience of contemplation from the perspective of the Hindu or Buddhist view of nonduality. As he puts it: "But what does this kind of nondualist imperialism do to Christianity? It eliminates its distinctive nature. Let me be clear about this. Used in this way, Zen awakening, which could be a wonderful gift for Christians, becomes destructive of Christianity" (31). Arraj sees this as but one expression of what he calls reactionary theology or "theology without a net," which has been developing since the Second Vatican Council. As opposed to this form of dialogue, which compromises the essence of Christian faith, Arraj discusses the approaches of Jacques Dupuis and the document Dominus Iesus, which he understands as two different versions of a proper Catholic position. After discussing a number of unsatisfactory approaches to the question of religious pluralism, he introduces the distinction between an existentialist approach, which focuses on the universality of the salvific will of God, and an essentialist approach, which emphasizes the uniqueness of Jesus as the mediator of salvation. This distinction between existence and essence forms one of the dominant themes of the book.Arraj offers an overview and critique of most of the existing approaches to the East-West dialogue, and then moves on to offering alternative proposals for the dialogue. While many are in the process of "overcoming" the metaphysical tradition of Christianity, Arraj sees precisely in this tradition a promising starting point for the dialogue with Zen Buddhism. After analyzing the particularly Thomistic manner of distinguishing essence and existence and some study of references to the experiences of loss of self in the ultimate realization, Arraj comes to the conclusion that what Thomistic metaphysics thinks of as "intuition of being" and what Asian traditions describe as the experience of Enlightenment "are both deeply metaphysical experiences of the same reality, but by different paths, and so they express themselves in different ways" (206). This, then, provides the necessary basis for the two traditions [End Page 165] to retain their respective identities while nonetheless learning from the other. In God, Zen, and the Intuition of Being Arraj offers some thoughts on how this might proceed. The clearest of these thoughts appear to lie on the side of what a discussion with Zen might do for Christianity. This is a matter, first of all, of rekindling an interest in Thomistic metaphysics through an introduction of categories and spiritual techniques that are part of the Zen tradition. At minimum, this would open a way beyond, or perhaps behind, the scholasticism of the manuals that have covered the true profundity of Christian Thomistic metaphysics. Whatever the philosophical stakes of this recovery, Arraj is especially interested in its spiritual promise, in the possibility of inviting certain aspects of Zen meditation—the use of koans, increased attention to nature—to help Christianity in developing a new form of acquired contemplation. Arraj has somewhat less to say about what or how much this sort of dialogue might offer Zen... (shrink)

Duns Scotus's famous proposition was first attacked in a short polemical treatise attributed to Thomas of Sutton. By the time of Ockham, the proposition was known as the propositio famosa, so called by Walter Chatton, Ockham's colleague at Oxford and London, who defended it against Ockham's lengthy critique. At Paris, during the same period, it was called the propositio vulgata and was used approvingly by Francis of Meyronnes, Peter of Navarre and Durandus St. Pourçain. This “famous proposition” was so controverted (...) because on it depended the acceptance, with Duns Scotus, or the rejection, with Ockham, of theology as a strict, propter quid science. As its detractors and defenders must have realized, it also struck at the heart of the divergent philosophical outlooks of Duns Scotus and Ockham. For all of this, Duns Scotus's famous proposition and its history have all but escaped notice. (shrink)

Students of the Orestes are fortunate to have two excellent commentaries at their disposal, by C. W. Willink and M. L. West . Neither will help them to understand this line, which is ‘the only allusion to Ganymede's horsemanship’ , because ‘no story of riding by Ganymede is known’ . But we are repeatedly reminded that the scene with the Phrygian has far fewer affinities with tragedy than with comedy, and εριπιδαριστοφαíζεται Comedy provides the clue, specifically at Ar. Vesp. 50If. (...) and Lys. 676ff. The reference is to the variety of equestrianism for which Ganymede is far from unknown . For Innoavvr) here describes a σχμα ρωτικóν and the line means Ganymedes concubinus, Iovis supini inguini insidens et equitans, sc. inter causas fuit malorum propter Iunonis invidiam Troianis immissorum. (shrink)

The following text seeks to identify the origins of what has come to be called the Sokal hoax. It appears that these origins remain problematic insofar as they cannot be thought without engaging into intrinsically duplicitous thinking. Thus, « originally », the gesture of the hoax is indeed « productive and conflictive, and no self-identity, no unity, and no inherent simplicity can possibly precede it », as « he » said, but « he » was disseminating, as we say. But (...) that is precisely the « strength » of the « form » of the Sokal hoax. With the delicate question of origins as its stumbling block—a stumbling block which may also be the question of irony—, the present text takes its cue from an passage from La Barbarie à visage humain and proposes to reveal the constructive consequences of the affair triggered by the hoax, while constantly paying tribute to its performance. Whether my argument will make it possible to distinguish the consequences from the origins remains moot : post hoc ergo propter hoc. One must remember that this is a sophism. (shrink)

Résumé Le texte qui suit s’efforce d’identifier l’origine de ce qu’il convient d’appeler « l’affaire Sokal ». Il appert que celle-ci reste problématique dans la mesure où elle n’est pas pensable sans engager, centralement, une duplicité. À « l’origine », le mouvement du canular sokalien est donc bien « productif et conflictuel et aucune identité, aucune unité, aucune simplicité originaire ne saurait [le] précéder », comme disait l’autre, mais il disséminait, paraît-il. C’est pourtant là la « force » de la (...) « forme » du canular sokalien. Achoppant sur la délicate question de l’origine (qui est probablement aussi celle de l’ironie), mais saluant sans cesse le travail du canular, à partir d’un extrait de La Barbarie à visage humain, cet article entend révéler les conséquences constructives de cette affaire. Il n’est pourtant pas sûr que son argumentation permette de distinguer la conséquence de l’origine : post hoc ergo propter hoc. Il s’agit d’un sophisme, rappelons-le. (shrink)

We present English translations of two French documents to show that the main reason for the rejection of Semmelweis's theory of the cause of childbed fever was because his proof relied on the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy, and not because Joseph Skoda referred only to cadaveric particles as the cause in his lecture to the Academy of Science on Semmelweis's discovery. Friedrich Wieger, an obstetrician from Strasbourg, published an accurate account of Semmelweis's theory six months before Skoda's (...) lecture, and reported a case in which the causative agent originated from a source other than cadavers. Wieger also presented data showing that chlorine hand disinfection reduced the annual maternal mortality rate from childbed fever from more than 7 per cent for the years 1840–1846 to 1.27 per cent in 1848, the first full year in which chlorine hand disinfection was practised. But an editorial in the Gazette médicale de Paris rejected the data as proof of the effectiveness of chlorine hand disinfection, stating that the fact that the MMR fell after chlorine hand disinfection was implemented did not mean that this innovation had caused the MMR to fall. This previously unrecognized objection to Semmelweis's proof was also the reason why Semmelweis's chief rejected Semmelweis's evidence. (shrink)

Résumé La Lettre secrète de la SCDF à tous les évêques catholiques (juin 2000) dénie que l’Église orthodoxe puisse être une Église sœur de l’Église catholique, affirmation qui avait permis à la Commission internationale de dialogue théologique entre les deux Églises de récuser l’uniatisme à Balamand en 1993. La Lettre s’appuie sur les mises en garde de Communionis notio, Apostolos suos et Dominus Iesus. Ces documents veulent éviter que des expressions comme « subsistit in » (LG 8) et « (...) in quibus et ex quibus existit una et unica ecclesia catholica » (LG 23) puissent favoriser une compréhension de l’Église comme communion d’Églises. Aussi au vocabulaire de la catholicité préfèrent-ils celui de l’universel et du particulier, affirmant significativement « l’antériorité chronologique et ontologique de l’Église universelle sur les Églises particulières », et sa maternité à leur égard ; soulignant enfin que l’Église du Christ « subsiste » dans la seule Église catholique. Les différentes analyses présentées dans l’article illustrent la solidité doctrinale de Balamand, précisent l’autorité de la Lettre et montrent que l’engagement œcuménique et la réception de Vatican II vont de pair désormais. Ecclésiologie de communion et théologie des Églises sœurs apparaissent comme doctrinalement solidaires. (shrink)

AM Hendropriyono 2021, Filsafat Intelijen. Sebuah Esai ke Arah Landasan Berpikir, Strategi, serta Refleksi Kasus-kasus Aktual, Jakarta: PT Hedropriyono Strategic Consulting. Bagi seorang "filosof emeritus" ("filosof afkiran") seperti penulis buku Hendropriyono menarik karena menjadi kelihatan bagaimana seorang 0tokoh yang profesinya jauh dari filsafat dapat memanfaatkan pendekatan filosofis. Yang dimaksud Hendropriyono dengan "filsafat Intelijens" memang bukan filsafat seperti filsafat moral atau filsafat politik atau filsafat manusia. Melainkan filsafat sebagai cara seorang tokoh inteligens Indonesia menjalankan tugasnya, mengumpulkan pengetahuan tentang ancaman-ancaman tersembunyi yang (...) dihadapi suatu negara, dalam kasus ini, Indonesia. Dalam definisi Hendropriyono: "Filsafat intelijen memahami keamanan sebagai suatu kebebasan dari bahaya yang mengancam personal, informasi, komunikasi, pernaskahan fisik dan non-fisik serta lingkungan hidup manusia" h. 103). Hendropriyono memperlihatkan bagaimana ketajaman filosofis dapat membantu melihat realitas dari pelbagai segi, menghindar misalnya dari tiga sikap keliru klasik yang sudah diangkat oleh para filosof Yunani, sofisme, paralogisme dan sikap echolalian (h. 56), sadar akan perangkap logical fallacies seperti argumentasi ad hominem, sikap latah (bandwagon), kesimpulan yang tergesa-gesa (hasty generalization), menganggap A disebabkan B hanya karena terjadi sesudah B (post hoc, bukan propter hoc), dikotomi keliru, circular reasoning dan membiarkan diri dibawa sesat karena mengikuti suatu red herring (h. 133 s.). Pendekatan filosofis akan membuat was-was terhadap "pemikrian konspirasi", informasi top-down dan hoaks. Dalam bukunya Hendropriyono membawa pendekatan filosofis itu pada kejadian-kejadian di dekade-dekade terakhir. Msalnya Arab spring dengan pergolakan-pergolakan luar biasa yang mengikutinya: Mesir dengan semangat demokrasi yang justru membawa Ikhwanul Muslimen ke puncak kekuasaan, hanya untuk kemudian digulingkan oleh Jendral Siwi dengan dukungan Al Azhar dan Gereja Koptik. Kekacauan luar biasa di Siria dan Irak di mana Amerika Serikat mendukung gerakan demokratis dengan harapan bisa menggulingkan diktator Bashar al-Assad, hanya untuk akhirnya malah menjadi pendukung ISIS - yang menyingkirkan gerakan demokratis - karena Assad didukung oleh Rusia dan Iran. Sebelumnya Amerika Serikat juga dengan logika kepentingannya membuat kacau Haiti: Sesudah Amerika mendukung Jean-Bertrand Aristide, presiden pertama Haiti yang dipilih secara demokratis, yang menggantikan diktator "Baby Doc" Duvalier, tetapi karena Aristide dianggap terlalu kiri, Amerika mendukung penggulingannya; sampai sekarang Haiti kacau. Dan ada contoh logical dan political fallacies lain yang dianalisa, misalnya perang proxy di Afganistan. Tentu Hendropriyono juga memakai pendekatan filsafat untuk melihat pekembangan di Indonesia. Amendemen UUD 1946 pasca reformasi, masalah Papua, gejala populisme, keberhasilan deradikalisasi seperti misalnya terwujud dalam Pondok Pesantren Al-Zaitun. Sama dengan alm. Romo Nikolaus Drijarkara Hendropriyono menunjukkan bahwa "Sila Pancasila yang Ke II, Kemanusiaan yang Adil dan Beradab, merupakan landasan bagi implementasi seluruh sila-sila dalam Pancasila" (142). Tentu ada juga beberapa kesalahan. Perang Napoleon tentu berlangsung di abad ke-18 dan permulaan abad ke-19 (h. 29), Hitler berkuasa di Jerman tahun 1933 (h. 38), demonstrasi dua Desember (212) terjadi di tahun 2017, bukan 2016 (56), dan PD II bukannya diadakan untuk menjatuhkan Hitler, melainkan yang memulainya memang Hitler (146). Buku ini sekaligus membuat pembaca paham bagaimana Hendropriyono melihat realitas politik, baik di Indonesia maupuan situasi internasional. Ia bermaksud menunjukkan bagaimana "kacamata" filsafat membantu untuk memahami apa yang terjadi dalam dimensi politik, dimensi utama yang mau dilindungi dari kejahatan oleh aparat inteligence. Suatu buku yang cukup khas. Franz Magnis-Suseno. (shrink)

Tematem artykułu jest filozofia miłości rozwijana przez dwóch wybitnych fenomenologów wymienionych w tytule: Dietricha von Hildebranda i Karola Wojtyłę. Obydwaj korzystali w swoich badaniach z metody fenomenologicznej; celem artykułu jest pokazanie, że w obydwu wypadkach metoda ta prowadziła do podobnych rezultatów. Autor czyni to w trzech krokach. Po pierwsze, pokazuje, że miłość pojętą w sensie ogólnym obydwaj autorzy rozumieją jako odpowiedź na wartość osoby. W Lubelskiej Szkole Personalizmu zasada miłości została wyrażona w formule: persona est affirmanda propter seipsam, a (...) treścią afirmacji, która jest należna osobie, jest miłość. W kategoriach von Hildebranda zasada ta wyrażona jest w sposób następujący: dobro osoby afirmowane jest poprzez obiektywne dobra dla osoby, które stanowią właściwą treść miłości. Po drugie, obydwaj autorzy wiele uwagi poświęcają tej specyficznej formie miłości, jaką jest miłość małżeńska. Podczas gdy mińość w sensie ogólnym stanowi odpowiedź na wyjątkową wartość osoby w stosunku do świata pozaosobowego, to miłość małżeńska jest odpowiedzią na wyjątkową wartość jednej osoby pośród wszystkich innych osób doświadczaną przez osobę płci przeciwnej. W tym sensie miłość małżeńska jest również specyficzną odpowiedzią na wartość. Po trzecie, doświadczenie miłości małżeńskiej pokazuje, że nie istnieje sprzeczność między wolnością a wzajemną przynależnością, co von Hildebrand wyraził w pojciu intentio unionis. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 22 (2002) 163-179 [Access article in PDF] Emptiness and Dogma Joseph S. O'Leary Sophia University The controversial Vatican document Dominus Iesus reasserts that non-Christian religions are objectively in a defective situation as regards salvation.Etymologically, salvation (soteria salus) means health. Here I should like to reflect on apparent symptoms of ill health in Christian theology and ask if Buddhist wisdom can help us formulate a diagnosis and (...) bring the issues into perspective in a healing way. I shall take as my guiding thread an idea familiar to readers of this journal, namely, that Christian theology has suffered from a delusive clinging to substance and identity, and that the Buddhist teachings of dependent co-arising, emptiness, and non-self may provide an antidote.Biblical and Christian traditions are rich in resources for a critique of substantialist conceptions of God and self. The God of the Bible is constantly shattering the fixated, idolatrous images his worshippers form of him, and the Johannine language of God as Spirit, light, love, locates God in a dynamic realm of communal contemplation from which it would be difficult to distill a well-defined divine substance suited to metaphysical analysis. As for self, Paul, and later Luther, present the Christian self as an existential and relational event, not a substantial self-contained soul.What of Christian theology as shaped from Greek metaphysics? Is it irredeemably substantialist, prey to naive reification and objectification? The definition of God as ipsum esse subsistens("being itself subsisting") sufficiently eludes objectification to include the Plotinian sense of God as "beyond being." The idea adopted from Aristotle that "the soul [as knower] is in a manner all things" suggests that metaphysical theology also developed a nonobjectifying conception of human being. The Christological debates of the early Christian centuries rely of necessity on substance language, yet in placing that terminology at the service of a revealed mystery beyond the grasp of language or thought, they introduce a ferment of paradox into the play of concepts and make of it a dance of traces, following the contours of a reality that cannot be brought under substantialist rubrics.Some might see the brilliant relational fireworks of Thomist trinitarian speculation as deconstructing logocentric images of divinity. However, the Trinity in itself is probably best seen as an abstract remainder concept, postulated as a dim background of the revealed phenomenon of Father, Jesus Christ, and Spirit, so that to spin stories of theories about it is futile, a form of misplaced concreteness. Robert Magliola finds [End Page 163] Nagarjunian resonances in the trinitarian logic of the Council of Florence, notably in the decree it addressed to the Copts in 1442 (Magliola, 85-89). The Copts were given an extra dose of the logic that had caused profound unease among the Greek delegates three years earlier (see Gill, 227-232; 325). How much of this later logic did the Latins read back into the patristic texts they cited? Though unbeatable in the fifteenth century, how convincing is it today? Theology has to face the hermeneutical task, and an ongoing one, of assessing the status and function of this trinitarian logic and referring it back to the biblical basis.The desubstantializing tendencies just noted can be drawn on in a contemporary "overcoming of metaphysics" in theology. But the mainstream of the tradition invested massively in substance and identity. It was by strong affirmations of substantial identity that Christianity made its way in the world. Dogma determined the identities of Father, Son, and Spirit as consubstantial hypostases of the one God, the identity of Jesus Christ as true God and true man united in one hypostasis, the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist, the unity, sufficiency, infallibility of the Church and its Scriptures, the continuity of the episcopal and papal ministries as transmitted from the apostles. The substantiality of what was proclaimed was matched by the total conviction of the faith that proclaimed it. Theologians might tinker with speculative elaborations, but the core of faith and dogma was untouchable, never subjected to doubt or questioning.It is a kind of metadogma that all... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Unspoken Word: Negative Theology in Meister Eckhart's German SermonsOliver DaviesBruce Milem. The Unspoken Word: Negative Theology in Meister Eckhart's German Sermons. Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2002. Pp. ix + 192. Cloth, $44.95.Questions of meaning in Meister Eckhart's German sermons have prompted a series of recent studies by scholars interested in the dynamics of language and piety as they emerged in vernacular texts written (...) in Northern Europe in the late Middle Ages. Bruce Milem's book sits within this school of reflection and is to be distinguished by his decision to frame the discussion within the context of a theory of the image, as developed by Eckhart across a number of works. It is this hermeneutic which gives coherence to The Unspoken Word and which allows the author to build an understanding of the role of language in Eckhart's sermons that draws upon Brecht's theory of the Verfremdungseffekt. According to this, alienation of language, or the disruption of its ordinary meanings, acts as its objectification in such a way that the audience is prompted to reflect upon their own situatedness with respect to the meanings which are disclosed within it. Language, or narrative, of this kind acts as a hermeneutic of self-critique and enhanced self-understanding.Milem bases his argument concerning the image on a close reading of just four sermons: 52 (Beati pauperes spiritu), Sermon 2 (Intravit Iesus in quoddam castellum), Sermon 16B (Quasi vas auri solidum) and Sermon 6 (Iusti vivent in aeternum). In these texts, expressed in different ways, he discerns firstly a theoretical outworking of the image as something that is defined by virtue of its relation to its source. The classic discussion of this comes in Sermon 16B with its discourse on a reflection in a mirror, whereby the image is "at one" with its source. But Milem rightly extends this theory to mean that in so far as all created things are images, they can be defined with respect to their relation to their source in God, rather than that of which they are images. But created images can also be defined in terms of their dissimilarity to their source: their incompleteness and temporality. The particular place of the sermon is given with its capacity to enact this condition of the image in ways that make it explicit.Milem argues for the German sermon as "an event" which is at the same time a mode of self-knowing, whereby the self comes to a deeper realisation of its dependence upon the divine at every moment of its being and action. Being ourselves constituted as "image," we are conditioned by the dialectic of likeness and distinction which characterises the relation of all images to the Creator. In our case however this is a state which can be realised in an existential act of reflection as a possibility which is opened up for us by our entry into the very particular, disruptive linguistic world of the sermon. This is an advancement on Walter Haug's notion of the language of the sermon as "transformational" but it adds to it a nice distinction of the status of the human creature as "image" and therefore conditioned by dissimilarity as much as likeness.In The Unspoken Word, Bruce Milem offers us a careful and intelligent analysis of the four sermons as exemplifying a kind of linguistic alienation which serves the end of self-illumination, as we come into a new possession of ourselves as being both intensively "like" God and utterly distinct from Him. This is not merely a cognitive change in us but also an existential one, as Milem's analysis of the theme of justice and human action in Sermon 6 shows. To this extent, his use of the hermeneutic of the image as signaling both likeness and distinction at an existential level usefully opens up new avenues of understanding. To some extent however this trajectory would have been strengthened by taking into account the two areas of inquiry with which Milem chooses not to engage (15-18), namely the relation between the German and Latin works and the question of whether... (shrink)

Al lettore che nella produzione speculativa di Anselmo si sofferma in modo particolare su De veritate, De libertate arbitrii, De casu diaboli e De concordia, la volontà si manifesta come un indiscutibile centro di interesse della riflessione anselmiana, tesa a determinare teoreticamente il valore e l'efficacia della iustitia, intesa come rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata, in ambito etico ed ontologico. La voluntas si presenta così quale protagonista del rapporto tra Dio e creatura, tra natura, storia ed eternità, perché è (...) proprio mediante gli atti volontari che la creatura può inserirsi od opporsi attivamente al rectus ordo della creazione, che a sua volta costituisce come una forma di libera oggettivazione del farsi altro da sé, rimanendo se stessa, della summa rectitudo. Attraverso questo movimento la rectitudo e la recta voluntas divina si pongono e si mostrano come l'essenza della realtà. Rivelando voluntas e rectitudo una valenza ad un tempo etica e metafisica, si potenzia il significato della volontà come responsabilità e come agente intrinsecamente libero che Anselmo le attribuisce. La voluntas, che vuole perché vuole, si sottrae al regno della necessità e si impone, in quanto artefice di libertà, come la protagonista aporetica della relazione tra la stabilità dell'ordine della realtà e la novità della storia, inchiodando Anselmo, amante della necessità razionale, alla celebrazione di una forza decisiva e ultimativa, che sembra sfuggire al pieno controllo della ratio. (shrink)